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NOTES
ELECTRONIC MAR AND CONFIDENTIAL CLIENT-
ATTORNEY COMMUNICATIONS: RISK MANAGEMENT
TITRODUCTION
Automation of communication in the legal community has
generally been met with resistance.' The legal community, like
society as a whole, is uncomfortable with change.2 Moreover, at-
torneys are resistant to automation of communication because of
their duties to maintain the confidentiality of client-attorney com-
munications. These duties require the placement of strong controls
over communications. When automation occurs, a sense that control
cannot be maintained provides a basis for heightened resistance.'
New communication technologies that provide sufficient bene-
fits to the profession must be, and eventually are, accepted by the
legal community even though confidentiality concerns exist. The
entrance of the telegraph into the profession provides an example.4
" See JAMES MILLEs, INTERNET HANDBOOK FOR LAW LIBRARIANS 1 (1993) (quoting
Paul Bernstein, Bulletin-Board Systems Hold Accessible Pools of Information, NAT'L LJ,,
Apr. 7, 1986, at 15). Milles wrote:
The history of electronic communication in the legal .. professionfa has not
always been one of enthusiastic embrace of innovation. The story is told that
"many years ago, one of the largest New York law firms would not allow a
new invention, the telephone, to be anywhere in its office except in the recep-
tion area, where it was kept to show clients how advanced and up-to-date the
firm was."
Id.
. "Attorneys are most comfortable when conservative. Either they want to do it the
old way, or they want to see a herd doing it the new way." BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE
LAW OF ELE ONIC COMMERCE 36 (1991).
See David Andrews, The Legal Challenge Posed by the New Technologies, 24
JuRIMEITRcs J. 43, 43 (1983).
4 See MORRIS GRAY, A TREATISE ON COMMUNICATION BY TELEGRAPH 1 (1885)
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When faced with the introduction of the telegraph, attorneys
were concerned about confidentiality: How could confidentiality be
protected when interception of telegraphic messages was possible?5
Attorneys were also concerned about the applicability of the attor-
ney-client privilege to telegraphic messages: Could the privilege
apply when the nature of the telegraph required that a third party
be exposed to the contents of the confidential communication?6
Lawyers pondered these questions but were simultaneously aware
that rejecting the use of the telegraph outright, because of a failure
to understand how to control it, would not be efficient or profit-
able. The United States Supreme Court recognized that the tele-
graph was an "indispensable means of communication."7 Lawyers
responded by using the technology cautiously. The profession as-
sessed the telegraph's capability to carry confidential information
and established controls. One author created a substantial legal
telegraphic code that "enable[d] lawyers to transmit telegraphic
messages in their own legal phraseology, secretly. . .. "'
The legal community no longer uses the telegraph, but must
never discontinue its assessment of new communication technolo-
gies for their ability to carry confidential information. The legal
community must continue to develop controls over beneficial tech-
nologies to enable their use in spite of their weaknesses.
This Note performs such an assessment, and suggests a control
with respect to another technology that is becoming an indispens-
able means of communication: electronic mail (e-mail).9 The con-
cern of this Note is whether e-mail should be used by the legal
profession to carry confidential ° communications.
A three inquiry risk management approach is adopted to guide
(defining the telegraph as "an apparatus, or a machine, used to transmit intelligence to a
distance with the aid of electricity").
'. See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RE-
LATING TO WRTAPPING AND ELECRONIC SuRvEnLANCE, COMMSSION STUDIEs 2 (1976)
[hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION]. "Wiretapping as a technological improvement on
simple eavesdropping by the unaided ear came into being soon after the invention of the
telegraph. Opposing forces in the Civil War tapped telegraph lines for military intelli-
gence." Id.
6 See GRAY, supra note 4, at 206-17.
" Id. at 210; see Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877).
"The electric telegraph marks an epoch in the progress of time.... It is indispensable as
a means of inter-communication." Id. at 9.
' Legal Code Corp., Preface to FRANK W. HELLER, LEGAL TELEGRAPnC CODE v
(1925).
. For a definition of electronic mail, see infra note 25 and accompanying text.
' The definition of confidential, as used in this Note, depends upon whether the
reader's state is a jurisdiction that has adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
or a jurisdiction that has adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. For a
definition based upon the Model Rules, see infra note 87 and accompanying text. For a
definition in a Model Code jurisdiction, see infra note 88 and accompanying text.
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the analysis." The first inquiry is whether e-mail is a risk man-
agement category.'2 This examination looks at the technology of
electronic mailing, the limitations of the technology, and the rela-
tionship of the technological limitations to attorneys' current and
potential use of e-mail. This section concludes that although benefi-
cial to the attorney, the use of electronic mail to carry confidential
client-attorney communications is risky.
The second inquiry is whether systems and procedures exist
that reduce or attempt to reduce the risks associated with electronic
mail. 3 This inquiry examines technological and legal systems and
procedures that are available to the legal community to control the
risks identified in the first inquiry.
14
The third inquiry asks what strategy should be developed to
control the risks that fall outside the protections identified in the
second inquiry. 5 Some members of the legal community suggest
that whether or not a duty exists, the e-mail using attorney should
secure communications with technology. Another member of the
legal community suggests that the legal systems in place provide
sufficient protection for the attorney. To him, the use of security
technology is solely a matter of business judgment. This Note
concludes that an affirmative duty be placed on the attorney, but
not an affirmative duty specifically to use security technology. Bar
association ethics panels should recognize in their formal opinions
a general duty of the attorney to take reasonable steps to protect
client confidences in e-mail messages. Such a control will inevita-
bly force the legal community to develop a professional standard
of using security technology, without discouraging the use of elec-
tronic mail. The approach is also adaptable to the changing tele-
communications frontier.
I. IDENTIFYING E-MAIL AS A RISK MANAGEMENT CATEGORY
The first step in assessing whether e-mail should be used by
the legal community to carry confidential communications is exam-
ining whether the use of e-mail is a risk management category.'6
Identification of an element of legal practice as a risk management
category denotes that the element has some risky characteristics. In
other words, associated with the element there are "danger[s] that,
if not controlled, may lead to... consequence[s] unintended by
" See ANTHONY E. DAVIS, RISK MANAGEMENT (1995) (suggesting law firms adopt
risk management procedures).
'z See infra Part II.
' See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 22.
" See infra Part M.
' See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 22; infra Part IV.
" See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 22.
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and actually or potentially harmful to a law firm or practitioner."1
One element of practice readily defined as a risk management
category is client intake." A danger associated with this element
of practice is failing to discover a conflict of interest before ac-
cepting a client. If the danger materializes and a conflict of interest
is not discovered, disqualification from representation 9 or disci-
plinary sanctions'a may ensue. These consequences are harmful to
the law firm or practitioner and therefore risk management catego-
rization is appropriate. A second example is docket and calendar
management." The danger associated with this element of practice
is missing a statute of limitations. Failure to observe a statute of
limitations is potentially harmful to the practitioner or law firm as
it may lead to an attorney malpractice claim.' Docket and calen-
dar management is therefore also appropriately recognized as a risk
management category.
Is communicating confidential information via e-mail likewise
deserving of risk management categorization? Lost confidentiality is
a danger associated with using e-mail.2 If the danger materializes
and confidentiality is lost, disciplinary sanctions, a legal malprac-
tice suit, and waiver of the attorney-client privilege may ensue.'
Thus, risk management categorization of e-mail usage is appropri-
ate. The danger of e-mail, if not controlled, may lead to conse-
quences that are unintended by, and potentially harmful to the legal
community.
A. How Confidentiality is Lost: E-Mail Technology
E-mail is a method of message exchange that enables users to
communicate with one another noninteractively when their comput-
ers are connected.' E-mail capabilities depend not only on users,
7 Id. at 15.
. See id. at 25-28.
'9 See Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. I. 1975)
(disqualifying an attorney, due to potential conflict of interest, from representing a corpo-
ration as well as its shareholders in a derivative suit), affd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976).
See Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Grelle, 237 N.E.2d 298 (Ohio 1968) (upholding an
attorney reprimand for representation of clients with conflicting interests).
2. See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 32.
21 See id. at 117.
' To demonstrate, this Note discusses e-mail technology and the technology's limita-
tions. See infra Part I1.A.
' The ethical and legal principles that guide the client-attorney relationship establish
these consequences. See infra Part I.C.
2. See James R. Neill, Electronic Mail, in 1 MACMILAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CoMPUT-
ERS 353 (Gary G. Bitter ed., 1992). Other definitions of electronic mail include
"[c]orrespondence that is transmitted from one computer terminal to another through data
communications lines," LINDA GAIL CHRisTm & JOHN Cnmsr, TaE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MlcRocowurEm TErmiNoLoGY (1984), and "a way for computer users to exchange mes-
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but on two different technologies: networks, the means by which
computers are connected,' and store-and-forward technology, facil-
itating the noninteractive nature of e-mail
1. Networks
Initially it is important to understand that although one has
electrdnic mailing capabilities, he or she cannot by default reach
any individual with an electronic mail address.s Internal electronic
mail systems exist which allow individuals in an enterprise to e-
mail only one another.29 An internal system typically relies on a
local area network (LAN) ° and has no connection to networks
outside of the enterprise. The result is one type of closed network;
connections are limited to a predefined population,3 such as all
lawyers in one law firm. Security problems exist under this type of
system32 but security concerns such as third party eavesdropping,
hacking,33 or mistakenly sending documents to parties with ad-
verse interests are not as acute, absent insider espionage. Internal e-
mail systems are therefore not the focus of this Note.
Internal e-mail systems are to be compared with external e-
mail systems, which allow the sending and receiving of e-mail
outside the enterprise. External electronic messaging allows the
attorney to send e-mail to clients, to peers in other law firms, or to
anyone connected to the lawyer's network. Increasingly, external e-
mail is accomplished through connection of the office LAN to the
Interet s
"The Internet is an international network of computers and
sages," DANIEL P. DERN, ThE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEw USERS 130 (1994).
' "Networks connect computers to each other." HENRY H. PERRnrr, JR., LAW AND
THE INFORMATION SUPEHGHWAY 4 (1996) (emphasis omitted).
. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
2. See Charles R. Merrill, E-Mail for Attorneys from A to Z, N.Y. ST. BJ., May-June
1996, at 20, 20.
See id.
See PERirr, supra note 26, at 4 (noting that LAN's electrically connect from two
to hundreds of computers within geographical proximity of one another).
31- See id. at 5.
' Insider fraud, insider misuse of databases, and evidence tampering are three exam-
pies of misuse by authorized personnel. See PETER G. NEUMANN, COMPUrER-RELATED
RisKs 142 (1995).
31 "Hacking as a methodology to achieve some particular goal implies working at
something by experimentation or empirical means, learning about the process under review
or development by a4 hoc mechanisms." J. .N. Lee, Hacking, in 1 MACMI.LAN ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF COmpuTRS 425, 425 (Gary G. Bitter ed., 1992). One author suggested
categorizing hackers by their activities, defining the novice, student, and tourist as those
users who visit sites and learn about hacking. The crasher and thief are intruders interest-
ed in bringing harm to the systems they hack. See id. at 430.
See Merrill, supra note 28, at 21.
See DERN, supra note 25.
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computer networks,"3 and the user will notice little difference
between internal and Internet based external e-mailing.37 There are
greater security concerns with external message exchange, though,
because the Internet is an open network;" there is no predefined
class of potential users.39 The open nature of the Internet creates
security risks because of system interconnectivity.' The Internet
works because many different networks agreed to tie themselves
together and share data.4' An e-mail message may travel through
computers in several states or several countries before arriving at
its intended recipient's computer.42 However, "[i]nterconnection
results in the vulnerability of weak links endangering other parts of
an interconnected system. This phenomenon is particularly insidious
when different parts of a system fall under different managements
with different assessments of risk." 3 The Internet's use of many
different systems and many different computers limits the user's
level of security to the level of security used by the networks with
which it communicates." Community vulnerability is thus a secu-
rity issue inherent in networks.
Packet switching, the technology that enables the transfer of
data from one computer to another, does provide some security.4'
All data transmitted across networks is broken into chunks, called
PERRmr, supra note 26, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
'" One difference users will typically encounter is the addressing format of messages.
There are three pieces of an electronic mail address: the user name, the system, and the
domain. Users of an internal network need only the user name when addressing messages
to one another. Once e-mail extends outside the enterprise and across networks, though,
the system and domain of the recipient's network need to be included. For example, an
individual named Sue E. Smith attending Case Western Reserve University can be contact-
ed by e-mail by other Case students at an address such as SES. If Sue was being e-
mailed by an individual without an e-mail account at Case, the sender would have to
address the message to SES@po.CWRU.edu. See Jim Burton, How to E-Mail Anyone
From Anywhere, THE NET, Sept. 1995, at 73, 73.
' See PERr, supra note 26, at 5. "The Internet is the archetypal open network."
Id.
39. See id.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CoMPrmRS AT RISK 63 (1991). The Internet
was not developed with security in mind. The precursor to the Internet was developed by
the Department of Defense (DOD) in 1969, and a key basis for the network's develop-
ment was national security. The DOD was attempting to develop a system of communica-
tion that would withstand enemy attack, able to automatically reroute communications if
the route the communication was taking was disturbed by enemy attack. See JOHN R.
LEvINE & CAROL BAROUDI, THE INTERNEr FOR DUMMIES 11-12 (1993).
", See Jon Phillips, How Your Data Snakes Across the Internet, THE NET, Sept. 1996,
at 45.
4 See id. at 45-47.
41 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 40, at 63.
4 See DERN, supra note 25, at 380.
4 Packet switching is usually achieved in an external e-mail system with a set of
two protocols, TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol). See Phillips, supra
note 41, at 44.
[Vol. 48:309
ELECTRONIC MAIL & RISK MANAGEMENT
packets, by the protocols in the sender's e-mail software. The pack-
ets are then reassembled by the receiver's e-mail software.
The process of packet switching offers security because it is
very difficult for a snoop to track each specific piece (packet) of
the e-mail while it is in transmission, intercept it, and reassemble
the message. However, packet switching is not the complete so-
lution to network insecurity because although a difficult process,
packet interception is possible. One estimate indicates that 100,000
system passwords were stolen in 1994 through listening to network
packets, leaving many password protected systems vulnerable to
attack by unauthorized individuals.'
2. Store-and-Forward Technology
Electronic mail transmission also depends on store-and-forward
technology.49 Because electronic mail must travel through several
computers to reach its intended recipient, store-and-forward tech-
nology is used to ensure message arrival. "[W]hen a mail server
receives a[n electronic] message, it makes a copy (stores it) and
then does its best to pass it along (forward it). (The stored copy is
deleted after the receiving computer confirms receipt.) ' '"
Store-and-forward technology enables electronic mail to be
considered a "non-real-time" or "noninteractive" application' Un-
like a telephone conversation, which relies on "real-time" response
and interaction, store-and-forward technology allows electronic mail
to wait for the intended recipient to retrieve it (similar to voice
mail).
41 See id. The internet protocol inserts into each data packet the address to the in-
tended recipient's computer. Transfer control protocol then marks each packet with a
sequence number and "[wihen the packets reach their destination ... reassembles them
according to their sequence numbers.... If a specific packet is missing or corrupted,
TCP will request that it be resent" Id. The following excerpt, analogizing a packet
switched network to the United States Postal System, clarifies this point:
Let's say that you have a close friend in the island nation of Papua New
Guinea, to whom you want to send a copy of the manuscript for your new
and very long book. . . . Unfortunately, the manuscript weighs 15 pounds, and
the limit on packages to Papua New Guinea, is 1 pound. So you divide the
manuscript into 15 pieces and on each package you write something like PART
3 OF 15 and send them off. When the packages eventually arrive, probably not
in the right order, your friend takes all the pieces, puts them back in order,
and reads them. [N]etworks ...work pretty much the same way.
LEVINE & BAROUDI, supra note 40, at 56-57.
,* See G. Burgess Allison, Technology Update (visited Oct. 21, 1996)
<http://www.abanetorglpm/magazineltu963.htnl#tag0>.
0 See FREDERICK B. COHEN, PROTE-rION AND SEcuRry ON THE INFORMATION SU-
PEIGHWAY 75 (1995).
4" See DEN, supra note 25, at 136.
SeId.
51 See id.
31519981
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Although store-and-forward technology provides benefits to the
user,52 there are security concerns raised by the technology. Be-
cause electronic messages are stored for some period of time be-
fore the intended recipient actually reads them, messages are sus-
ceptible to being read by system administrators or by hackers who
unlawfully access the storage facility:53 "The greatest risk for most
email is at the two endpoints of the conversation. At both loca-
tions, most email is stored on computers in a form that's open and
easily read by whoever operates the endpoint computer system...
or ... by hackers."54
3. Users
E-mail also depends on users, and human error is another
basis of security risk:
Unlike paper correspondence, it is extremely easy to misad-
dress an e-mail. Computer users typically address e-mail
from an online directory. It is simple to click on the wrong
recipient's address or, worse, accidentally select the option
to send the e-mail to a large group of users when the
communication was intended to be confidential.55
Electronic mail is an insecure medium. Human users are falli-
ble; they may misdirect their communications. In addition, network
technology and store-and-forward technology are susceptible to
breach: "[D]isclosure of data while in electronic transit between
computer systems '  is possible, and "data files stored on disks or
other electronic media . . . [are susceptible to] tampering . . . or
unauthorized examination." Although computer crime may seem
to be an unrealistic concern, "if NASA, federal agencies of all
kinds, and financial institutions have security breaches, law firms
cannot assume it cannot or will not happen to them. '
Presently, the predominant usage of electronic mail in the legal
profession is reliance on internal systems,59 suggesting that these
52 See infra Part II.B.
" See Allison, supra note 47.
SId.
Michael Overly, Avoid the Legal Pifall of E-Mail, LAN MAG., Jan. 1, 1997, at 75,
75.
Cipher A. Deavours, Cryptography, in I MACMILLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUT-
ERS 211, 212 (Gary G. Bitter ed., 1992).
I d.
Paul Berstein, Encryption is Imperative For Lawyers Using The Internet: It's Not
Safe Out There, ILL. LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 1996, at 9; see also NEUMANN, supra note 32,
at 132-42 (briefing numerous examples of computer security breaches in both the public
and private sectors); Gary H. Anthes, Few Gains Made Against Hackers, CoMPirraR-
WORLD, Sept. 16, 1996, at 20, 20 (discussing repeated hacker activity at the Pentagon).
I" in a survey of corporate legal departments, use of internal e-mail was reported by
316 [Vol 48:309
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security issues are not yet of concern to the majority of attorneys.
But the following discussion shows there are great advantages to,
and a trend toward, expanding usage outside the enterprise.
B. Electronic Mail and the Legal Profession
Lance Rose points out in his book Netlaw% that in the 1966
novel, The Crying of Lot 49, Thomas Pynchon "imagined an alter-
native postal system riding on the back of intracorporate mail
operations, outside the monopoly reserved for the United States
Post Office." ' Electronic mail is becoming that alternative postal
system and, according to one commentator, is "destined to become
a universal communication tool. . ." An examination of exist-
ing statistics regarding worldwide use supports this proposition. 3
Although the percentage of worldwide users that are members
of the legal community is not yet determined, lawyers recognized
the potential benefits of e-mail from a point early in the develop-
ment of e-mail systems." Lawyers continue to discover the advan-
tages of electronic mail communications today, increasing e-mail
usage in their personal and professional capacities,' and recogniz-
ing that the worst mistake a computerizing attorney can make is
"[b]uying a computer without a modem.'"
68% of respondents while only 20% reported use of external e-mail. See AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, SURVEY OF AUTOMATION IN CORPORATE LEGAL DEPARTMENTS 35 (1993). In a
survey of mid-size law firms, 44% of responding firms indicated that internal e-mail was
available, and 9.8% of responding firm members indicated that they had external e-mail
capabilities. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, AUTOMATION IN MIDSIZE LAW FIRMS 9 (1992).
In a survey of smaller law firms, 50% of respondents with LAN's indicated that their
LAN's provided internal e-mail, and 16% indicated that their LAN's were used for exter-
nal e-mail. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, SURVEY OF AUTOMATION IN SMALLER LAW FIRMS
61 (1995).
' LANCE ROSE, NEThAW (1995).
61- Id. at 169.
6 Merrill, supra note 28, at 20.
63 In 1993 it was estimated that the world e-mail community included 20 to 30 mil-
lion users spanning 130 countries and 7 continents. See DERN, supra note 25, at 130. A
1996 article cited a figure of a worldwide userbase of 47 million. See Stevan Alburty, E-
Mail, E-Mail Everywhere, THE NET, Aug. 1996, at 22, 22. This suggests a growth of
between 17 and 27 million users in two years, and the userbase is using the technology:
"Approximately 3 billion electronic mail messages were exchanged in 1988, and the vol-
ume is expected to grow to ... 60 billion by the year 2000." Neill, supra note 25, at
353.
" The American Bar Association created an electronic communications network,
ABA/net, in 1984 to provide e-mail services. See American Bar Association Uses E-Mail
To Access Additional Services, ELECTRONIC MESSAGING NEWS (Phillips Publishing, Inc.),
Mar. 4, 1993.
6 A recent bar survey in Florida indicated that e-mail usage among its membership
increased 52% between 1994 and 1996. See John F. Harkness, Jr., Website Adds Value To
Bar Membership, FLA. BJ., July-Aug. 1996, at 10.
m Daniel E. Harmon, The Big "'-Hottest Topic At the ABA Techshow '95, TiE
LAWYER'S PC (Shepard's McGraw Hill, Inc., Colorado Springs, Colo.), May 1, 1995, at
1998]
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What are the benefits that attract users, specifically attorneys?
E-mail not only allows one-to-one communications,67 (for which
one could engage the services of the United States Postal Service)
but also enables efficient one-to-many communications (otherwise
achievable through a conference call or a mass mailing). In addi-
tion, features such as carbon copy and blind carbon copy permit
users to send one message to multiple addresses at once.'
Electronic mail also has advantages over the fax machine.
Although fax retains its position in the legal community as a fa-
vored means of communicating hard copies of documents,' elec-
tronic mail of documents still on a computer is more practical.
"[Ilf the sender and recipient both have external e-mail, it makes
the most sense to skip the fax entirely and send the document
from the sender's PC to recipient's PC and use recipient's printer
if a hardcopy is needed."70
The non-intrusive nature of electronic mail is also a benefit to
the attorney because "the e-mail message does not imply that an
immediate reading is required." '7 It allows attorneys to handle
messages at their leisure, enabling productivity. In addition, e-mail
allows ease of document manipulation. A redlined draft of a docu-
ment may be sent to opposing counsel via e-mail and edited with-
out re-keying.' Other advantages include the speed of document
delivery,73 and the speed of response achievable through electronic
mail.74
The reason that the use of electronic mail will continue to
explode in the legal profession is not just because of the efficiency
it provides within the firm or office. Client demand will force
lawyers to either begin to use, or expand their use of this technolo-
1, 1.
67 See ALAN L Ross, THE LAW COMES TO TERMS wrmH THE NET app. at 2 (1996).
" See Bill Weinman, NetFAQ, THE NET, Dec. 1996, at 100, 100. Carbon copy is
similar to a cc: line on a paper letter, indicating other recipients of the e-mail. See DERN,
supra note 25, at 148. Blind carbon copy, "[a]gain mimicking hardcopy letter conven-
tions .... lets [the user] include names of people [to receive] . . . a copy of the mes-
sage... without letting any of the To: or Cc: names ... [gain awareness] of it."
DERN, supra note 25, at 149.
69 See HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., How TO PRACTICE LAW wrrH COMPurTERs 274-76 (2d
ed. 1992).
Merrill, supra note 28, at 22.
7, Id. at 21.
r3 See id.
r- See Steven E. Ekeberg, Building a Healthier Relationship with Technology, 68
CLEVELAND BJ. 14, 14 (1996) ("[Clommunicating through e-mail ... ha[s] ... in-
creased the speed at which information can be created, revised, packaged, and delivered.").
' See Cleveland Thornton, Message dated Tuesday, 21 July 1992 15:32, in THE
EFFECTS OF ELEcrRoNic MAIL ON LAw PRACTICE AND LAW TE cmNG 4, 5 (1. Trotter
Hardy ed., 1994) (stating that immediate response to electronic messages is possible by
simply hitting the reply key and typing comments).
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gy. Technology savvy clients will look upon those lawyers with
electronic mailing capabilities favorably when shopping for an
attorney.75 The president of a law office consulting firm, for ex-
ample, noted recently that "clients are instructing their law firms
that they no longer wish to be billed for delivery services or fax
charges and that all communications with the firm should be
via.., e-mail .... 76 Meanwhile, one New Jersey attorney has
"watched e-mail steadily mature from a gossip novelty into a seri-
ous practice tool" in his law firm. The firm "now routinely
use[s] e-mail in preference to both letters and telephone for a
few... clients. In addition to questions and advice, [the firm]
attach[es] ... documents, spreadsheets, and even electronic
bills . .. 78 to the communications.
However, with increased usage there has not been an increased
understanding of the technology involved. For the ordinary user, an
understanding of the technology may not be critical. The technical
limitations of the medium are particularly insidious to the legal
community due to the strict requirement of confidentiality in the
client-attorney relationship.
C. Confidentiality in the Client-Attorney Relationship
"A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is
that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to
the representation." This principle of confidentiality inheres in
both legal and ethical duties imposed upon the lawyer. Whenever
the attorney and client communicate confidential information, by
any medium, there are two sets of considerations before the attor-
ney: how to uphold his or her ethical duty of confidentiality, and
how to uphold his or her legal duties of confidentiality.
1. Ethical Duty
The ethical duty of the attorney to maintain his or her client's
confidences is found in the lawyer codes. Model Rule 1.6 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct! (Model Rules) acts as the
7 See Merrill, supra note 28, at 21; see also Daniel E. Harmon, High Tech & Hap-
py Clients, THE LAWYsE's PC (Shepard's McGraw Hill, Inc., Colorado Springs, Colo.),
Oct. 1, 1994, at 1 (noting that clients can be served "much faster and more efficiently
through technology").
76. Michael J. DiCorpo, Technology-What Clients Demand, 68 CLEVELAND BJ. 8, 8
(1996).
77 Charles Merrill, Message dated Monday, 20 July 1992 23:58, in TIE EFFErS OF
ELECTRONIC MAIL ON LAW PRACTICE AND LAW TEACHING 2, 2 (1. Trotter Hardy ed.,
1994).
7L Id.
79. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.6 cmt. (1995).
m MODEL RULES OF PROFESsIONAL CONDUCt Rule 1.6 (1995). The Model Rule
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confidentiality provision drafting guide for those states whose ethi-
cal codes resemble the Model Rules. For those states' whose
codes continue to stem from the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (Model Code), Canon 4,2 its accompanying Ethical
Considerations, and Disciplinary Rule 4-101" provide guidance.
Whether the Model Rules or Model Code govern the jurisdic-
tion, the ethical duty is quite broad. Under both regimes, disclosure
of the protected information is prohibited in all circumstances,
unless specifically allowed. An attorney is allowed to reveal client
confidences when the client has been consulted and consents,"
provides that
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as
stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the law-
yer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodi-
ly harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer.....
Id.
", The only states that continue to utilize the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility are Georgia, Iowa, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee,
Vermont, and Virginia.
"z MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1983) ("A Lawyer
Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client.").
a' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSlBILITY DR 4-101 (1983). DR 4-101
states:
(A) 'Confidence' refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and 'secret' refers to other information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental
to the client.
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C) a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of
the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of
himself or a third person, unless the client consents after full disclo-
sure.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients
affected, but only after a full disclosure to them ....
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the informa-
tion necessary to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or
to defend himself... against an accusation of wrongful con-
duct. ..
Id. (footnotes omitted).
8. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(1) (1983); MoD-
EL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.6(a) (1995).
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and when the client impliedly authorizes the attorney to disclose
the confidence.' In addition, the lawyer is permitted to reveal
confidential information when the revelation may prevent the client
from committing a future crime.86
The two codes differ in their classifications of what information
is to be protected. Under the Model Rules, the attorney shall not
reveal any "information relating to representation."'  Under the
Model Code, the preservation required is of confidences and secrets
of the client. "'Confidence' refers to information protected by the
attorney-client privilege... 'secret' refers to other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested
be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing
or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.""8 The Model
Rules expanded the range of communications that fall under protec-
tion, "[a]n important contrast to the Code is that the Rule's pro-
scription goes beyond 'confidences and secrets' and extends to
'information', 89 but under both regimes the duty is great.
A failure to fulfill the duty of maintaining client confidences
may lead to imposition of disciplinary sanctions under the Model
Rules or the Model Code. The ABA Standards for Imposing Law-
yer Discipline (ABA Standards) "are a model for imposing sanc-
tions on attorneys based on the ethical duty involved, the party to
whom the duty is owed, the lawyer's motives and intentions, and
the injury caused by the misconduct." Penalties are provided in
the ABA Standards, and range from an admonition to disbarment
for disclosure of client confidences.91 In particular, an admonition
is appropriate when "a lawyer negligently reveals information relat-
ing to representation of a client ... and this disclosure causes
little or no actual or potential injury to a client." A reprimand
is appropriate when "a lawyer negligently reveals information relat-
ing to representation of a client ... and this disclosure causes
injury or potential injury to a client." The majority of both
Model Code and Model Rules jurisdictions look to the ABA Stan-
" See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmBLIY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1983); MOD-
EL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6(a) (1995); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.6 cmL. (1995).
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1983); MOD-
EL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1995).
" MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6(a) (1995).
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIITY DR 4-101(A) (1983).
89 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMrrH, 1 LEGAL MLPRACCE 643 (3d ed.
1989).
' In re Pressly, 628 A.2d 927, 929 (VL 1993).
9, See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER DISCIPLINE 4.21-.24 (1996).
91 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER DISCIPLINE 4.24 (1996) (emphasis added).
9- STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER DIscw UN 4.23 (1996) (emphasis added).
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dards for guidance when determining what sanctions, if any, are
appropriate.
94
2. Legal Duties
There are also legal duties of the lawyer with respect to confi-
dentiality; they are found in two bodies of law: the law of agency
and the law of evidence.
a. The Law of Agency
The law of agency defines fiduciary relationships as those
relationships that result "from the manifestation of consent by one
person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject
to his control, and consent by the other so to act."'95 Employment
relationships are usually guided by the law of contracts, with a
dereliction of the duties outlined giving rise to an action in con-
tract. The fiduciary relationship is unique, though. The fiduciary is
not merely employed, he or she is employed to act in the best
interest of his or her employer." Loyalty is thus a duty of the
fiduciary, a violation of this duty giving the employer a cause of
action outside of contract. Breach of a fiduciary duty gives rise to
an additional cause of action in tortY
It is easy to see that "[tihe attorney-client relationship is a
fiduciary relationship as a matter of law."98 The client-attorney
relationship is more than just an employment contract; confidence
and trust must be reposed in the attorney, and the attorney is re-
quired to remain loyal to his or her client. Thus, failing to main-
tain the confidences of a client is not only a breach of the
attorney's ethical duty, but also a breach of the attorney's fiduciary
duty of loyalty. It is generally agreed that a breach of this fiducia-
ry duty may be the basis of an attorney malpractice claim. 9
9' For Model Rules states adopting the ABA Standards, see, for example, People v.
McCray, 926 P.2d 578 (Colo. 1996); Committee on Legal Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v.
Boettner, 422 S.E.2d 478 (W. Va. 1992); Florida Bar v. Hosner, 513 So.2d 1057 (Fla.
1987). For Model Code jurisdictions, see, for example, In re Cutler, 650 N.Y.S.2d 85
(N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Dockery v. Board of Prof I Responsibility of the Supreme Court
of Tenn., 937 S.W.2d 863 (Tenn. 1996); In re Haws, 801 P.2d 818 (Or. 1990).
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958).
9" See ALFRED F. CONRAD ET AL., AGENCY ASSOCIATONS, EMPLOYMENT & PART-
NERsHIPS 328 (4th ed. 1987).
'" See RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF AGENCY introductory note (1958).
Clement v. Prestwich, 448 N.E.2d 1039, 1041 (111. App. CL 1983); see also David
Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339, 341 (Cal. CL App. 1988) ("The
relation between attorney and client is a fiduciary relation of the very highest charac-
ter. . . "); In re Wilson, 409 A.2d 1153, 1156 (NJ. 1979) ("Lawyers are more than
fiduciaries. ....).
. See Zeiden v. Oliphant, 54 N.Y.S.2d 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1945) (affirming a judg-
ment for attorney malpractice in favor of a client after the attorney revealed client confi-
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The elements of a malpractice claim include the existence of
the lawyer-client relationship,"° a duty owed,101 such as the
fiduciary duty of loyalty, and "departure or deviation from the
usual and customary practice within th[e] ... profession."" The
issue is not whether the attorney acted negligently; instead, an
examination into community standards of acceptable conduct is
made: whether an average attorney "would have been as careless or
imprudent as the defendant."'' Finally, "but for" causation"°
and actual harm sustained must be proven.
b. The Law of Evidence
The existence of the attorney-client privilege under the law of
evidence furthers the unique status given to confidential commu-
nications between the attorney and client. The attorney-client privi-
lege has been defined in the following way:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confi-
dence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
adviser, (8) except the protection be waived. 6
In a judicial proceeding the communications between an attorney
and an actual or potential client made "without the presence of
strangers... for the purpose of securing... legal services" are
thus privileged."° Neither the client nor the attorney may be
forced to testify as to the contents of such communications," as
long as the privilege is not waived.
The privilege is waived upon intentional communication of the
privileged information to a third party. When the "client testifies to
some of the [privileged] communications or permits the attorney to
so testify,"'" waiver ensues. In addition, "[tihe law will... im-
dences post discharge); MAEN & SMITH, supra note 89, at 644 (stating that
"[malpractice liability may be predicated upon a breach of confidence").
'm See DAVID J. MEISELMAN, ATrORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE 13
(1980).
202. See id.
0. Id. at 15-16.
"' Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1292, 1300 (1963).
"' See MEISELMAN, supra note 100, at 40.
, See id.
106. JOHN H. WIGMORE, 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292 (John T. McNaughton ed.,
rev. ed. 1961).
"'7 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950).
20" See CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr 73 (1996).
'a RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVI-
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ply a waiver whenever the holder of the privilege voluntarily dis-
closes or allows to be disclosed any significant part of the privi-
leged matter."'"0
An eavesdropper's acquisition of privileged information will not
typically threaten the privilege. On one level, federal law is appli-
cable. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),"'
discussed in more detail infra,"2 protects any otherwise privileged
communication, intercepted under the ECPA, from losing its privi-
leged character because of such interception."' The generally
adopted common law rule is also important: "[I]f a client has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations with his attor-
ney, then the privilege will not be jeopardized despite interception
or overhearing by an eavesdropper....4
Whether waiver occurs after an inadvertent disclosure of client
confidences is not clear. What is the result when the attorney mis-
takenly discloses a confidential memorandum during discovery, or
when an attorney or client misaddresses an e-mail containing confi-
dential information? Some jurisdictions maintain that for waiver to
result, such revelation to a third party must be intentional."5 Oth-
er jurisdictions hold, though, that disclosure always amounts to a
waiver, even if the disclosure is unintentional."6 A growing num-
DENcE 696 (2d ed. 1982).
II0 Id.
". Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Star.
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
' See infra Part HI.B.1.
". See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1994) (providing that "[n]o otherwise privileged wire,
oral, or electronic communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the
provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged character").
"" Dale W. Cottam, Cellular Communications and Confidentiality: Can Waiver Occur
On The Way To The Office?, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1185, 1203 (1992).
'"- See Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Fla.
1991) (holding that the inadvertent production during a discovery request of a privileged
transcript of various tape recorded conversations did not waive the privilege), affid in
part, 991 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1993); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp.
951 (N.D. M11. 1982) (holding that the inadvertent production during a discovery request to
opposing counsel of privileged letters did not constitute waiver).
"6 See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that disclosure of
a confidential memorandum to a government auditor waived the privilege); Golden Valley
Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (holding
that the privilege that had attached to a confidential letter was waived when the letter
was accidentally included in a discovery request; although the court did not explicitly
adopt the strict responsibility approach, it held that under the strict approach waiver would
result); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546 (D.C.
Dist. 1970) (holding that the presentation of a letter by plaintiff to defendant placed the
document in the public domain, breaching the confidentiality of the document, and thus
destroying any attached privilege); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D.
461 (E.D. Mich. 1954) (stating that "where the policy underlying the rule can no longer
be served, it would amount to no more than mechanical obedience to a formula to con-
tinue to recognize it").
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ber of jurisdictions will not lay down a strict rule, but maintain
that a number of factors must be examined before a determination
as to waiver can be made." 7 The effect of an inadvertent disclo-
sure of otherwise privileged information therefore varies by juris-
diction."'
Confidentiality is an important concern for lawyers. Profession-
al ethics mandate its maintenance, and the laws of agency and
evidence infuse its importance into the client-attorney relationship.
A failure to maintain confidentiality may result in disciplinary
sanctions against the lawyer, a claim of attorney malpractice if the
breach leads to measurable damages to the client, or possibly in
waiver of the attorney-client privilege that otherwise protected the
communication. The weaknesses in electronic mail technology are
thus appropriate concerns for attorneys.
The use of electronic mail in the conveyance of confidential
information is a risk management category. There are limitations
on electronic mail technology, creating a danger that confidentiality
can be lost through its use. There are also potentially harmful
consequences associated with failing to maintain client confidential-
ity. In other words, associated with the use of electronic mail,
"danger[s exist] that, if not controlled, may lead to... conse-
quence[s] unintended by and actually or potentially harmful to a
law firm or practitioner.. '1 9
]I. RISK LIMTNG SYSTEMS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE OR IN PLACE
It is important to restate and clarify the terminology being used
in this Note. The danger associated with using e-mail to convey
confidential information is a failure to maintain confidentiality. The
consequences of the materialization of this danger are disciplinary
sanctions, attorney malpractice claims, and waiver of the attorney-
client privilege. The danger, in association with the consequences,
makes e-mail risky.
When looking to limit risk it is necessary to examine the
means of decreasing the danger as well as means of decreasing the
harm of the consequences. There are currently technological and
legal systems available or in place that decrease the danger and
"' See Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding
a decision to apply a factor test, stating that such a test serves the purpose of the privi-
lege while not permitting the careless to enjoy its benefits); Monarch Cement Co. v. Lone
Star Industries, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 560 (D. Kan. 1990) (applying five factor test in finding
that due to reasonable efforts taken to prevent disclosure, the inadvertent production of
eight confidential pages in a 9,000 page discovery request did not waive the privilege).
,,L See James C. Rinaman Jr., What About Inadvertently Disclosed Documents or In-
formation?, 60 DEF. COUNSEL J. 613, 614 (1993) (discussing all three theories).
"' See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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consequences of using electronic mail to convey confidential infor-
mation.
A. Technological Systems
The communications security industry is constantly introducing
products into the marketplace that attempt to alleviate the electronic
mail user's security fears. These products can decrease the likeli-
hood that the danger associated with electronic mail, loss of confi-
dentiality, will be realized. The products offer technological fixes
to the previously discussed weaknesses in e-mail technology.
Two products introduced into the market in the fall of 1996
provide examples. The first product is compatible with most exist-
ing LAN based electronic mail systems and facilitates "[e]-mail
connections with partners, clients, and suppliers across a private
network... avoid[ing] the security and reliability pitfalls of
Internet E-mail."'" A second product is a tool that "contains ma-
trices, or tables, that allow organizations to match up applications,
threats and defenses into a kind of three-dimensional security
checklist. The matrices let.., users determine when a particular
type of security is inadequate or overkill.'' Either of these sys-
tems may help to minimize the dangers associated with electronic
mail usage. The first product would enable users to enlarge (or
create) a closed network, limiting the need for external e-mail and
thus avoiding its limitations. The second product allows a firm or
practitioner to determine the types of security technologies avail-
able and appropriate for its proposed use of e-mail. These products
are just two examples of the many available on the market today.
The most commonly cited technological solution to the confi-
dentiality problem, though, is the use of cryptography." "Cryp-
tography is the study of methods for secret writing' ' "D and the
'". Tim Ouellette, Internet Mail Service Links E-Mail Nets, COMPTERWORLD, Nov. 18,
1996, at 63, 68.
2. Gary H. Anthes, Tool May Allay 'Net Fears, COuPUTERWORLD, Oct. 21, 1996, at
89, 89.
'n See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the
Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709, 724 (1995) (suggesting that
professionals with a duty of confidentiality use encryption to protect that confidentiality);
Charles R. Merrill, A Cryptography Primer, in WHAT LAWYERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
THE INTERNET (Henry H. Perritt, Jr. ed., 1996) (stating that the solution to the security
problems of electronic commerce is encryption); E-Mail and Privacy-Keeping Confidential
E-Mail Confidential, LAW OFF. TECH. REV., Mar. 24, 1994 (reviewing the use of cryptog-
raphy as a method of ensuring confidentiality).
"f Deavours, supra note 56, at 211 (emphasis removed from original). Cryptography
works by applying an algorithm, called a key, to a plaintext message to encode it. A key
is then applied by the recipient to decipher the message. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED
CRYPTOGRAI'HY 3-5 (2d ed. 1996). The following explanation of two basic types of key-
based cryptosystems, symmetric key and public-key, clarifies this.
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goal of cryptography is to "enable... people.., to communicate
over an insecure channel in such a way that an opponent...
cannot understand what is being said."'
24
Cryptography is the favored e-mail protection because it is
extremely difficult to subvert. One publicly available cryptographic
software package, Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), allows implementa-
tions that provide security that range from "breakable, but with
much effort... [to] possibly breakable by three letter organiza-
tions... [to] generally believed unbreakable."'" The developers
of the algorithm underlying PGP even issued a challenge to
decrypt a message encrypted with the algorithm, estimating that it
would take forty quadrillion years to accomplish the feat."a The
developers overestimated the strength of their algorithm. Acceptors
of the challenge decrypted the message after only eight months.
This by no means invalidates the security of cryptography. To
decrypt the message "a worldwide team cooperating over the
Internet and using over 1600 computers"'" was required.
The use of cryptography, or other technologies, is thus an
effective means of protecting electronic mail communications from
tampering. Technological systems decrease the possibility that con-
fidentiality will be lost when e-mail is used.
B. Legal Systems
Legal systems are also in place that decrease the possibility
that confidentiality will be lost when e-mail is used. Legal systems
also decrease the effect and applicability of the consequences of
lost confidentiality.
Think of a symmetric algorithm as a safe. The key is the combination. Some-
one with the combination can open up the safe, put a document inside, and
close it again. Someone else with the combination can open the safe and take
the document out. Anyone without the combination is forced to learn safecrack-
ing.... [Plublic-key cryptography . . . [on the other hand] use[s] two differ-
ent keys-one public and one private. .... Anyone with the public key can
encrypt a message but... [o]nly the person with the private key can decrypt
the message. It is as if someone turned the cryptographic safe into a mailbox.
Putting mail into the mailbox is analogous to encrypting with the public key,
anyone can do it Just open the slot and drop it in. Getting mail out of a
mailbox is analogous to decrypting with the private key. Generally it's hard;
you need welding torches.
Id. at 61.
124 DOUGLAS R. STiNTON, CRYPTOGRAPHY: THEORY AND PRACnCE 1 (1995).
WRLAM STALLNGS, PROTECT YOUR PRIVACY: THE PGP USER'S GUIDE 63 (1995).
See id& at 64.
127. I d
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1. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (Title M)" "is the primary law protecting the security and
privacy of business and personal communications in the United
States today."'29 Congress enacted much of Title m to codify the
principles of law established in the Fourth Amendment Supreme
Court decision Katz v. United States,30 a case that greatly altered
Fourth Amendment interpretation.
Prior to Katz, Olmstead v. United States' outlined the funda-
mental legal rules of electronic eavesdropping in the United States.
According to Olmstead, the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures applied only to the seizure of
tangible items, and only to searches accomplished by a physical
invasion. Wiretaps and other means of electronic eavesdropping did
not violate the Fourth Amendment under Olmstead because they
did not provide the requisite physical trespass.'
Katz v. United States overturned Olmstead's position in
1967,' and paved the road for communication privacy in the
present age of telecommunications. In Katz, the Supreme Court
held that protection offered by the Fourth Amendment was intend-
ed to benefit "people, not places."'34 The Court stated that "the
Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items,
but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard
without any 'technical trespass under ... local property law."''
Title Im was subsequently enacted, adopting the principles estab-
lished in Katz, recognizing that both wire and oral communications
are protected from unlawful invasions of privacy.
36
Unfortunately, Title mH failed to keep pace with the changing
'" Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197,
213 (1968).
'29 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
'3- 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
13'. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
132 See id. at 466.
3. See 389 U.S. at 353.
'34 Id. at 351.
' " Id. at 353 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
'6 See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 5. Title III was also enacted to codi-
fy procedures for obtaining court authority to electronically eavesdrop; this portion of Title
ll is based upon the Supreme Court case of Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
Although Berger held unconstitutional a New York statute that authorized court approved
eavesdropping, "[tihe inference drawn from this decision ... was that electronic eaves-
dropping would be within accepted Fourth Amendment bounds when requirements of
particularity were included within a scheme of statutory provisions which allowed an
adequate degree of judicial approval and supervision." NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note
5, at 5.
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telecommunications landscape. The wire and oral communications
protected by Title I encompassed only the contents of communi-
cations audible and comprehensible by the human ear 37 (e.g. tele-
phone conversations, face to face discussions). Title III's failure to
protect electronic communications, including electronic mail,
prompted its amendment in 1986.2
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 9
(ECPA) amended Title I, expanding its coverage to protect elec-
tronic communications. The legislative history of the ECPA stated
its purpose as "updat[ing] and clarify[ing] Federal privacy
protections and standards in light of dramatic changes in new com-
puter and telecommunications technologies."'" The ECPA accom-
plished this purpose in three Titles, two of which are relevant to
this Note.
a. Title I of the ECPA
Title I... of the ECPA "protects communication streams (com-
munications while in transit),"'42 by punishing the interception of
communications. 43 Interception is the key violative activity under
Title I and is statutorily defined. An interception is any "aural or
other acquisition of the contents of any wire, [or] electronic...
'" See SENATE REPORT, supra note 129, at 2.
' See id. at 1-3.
"' See supra note 111.
'* SENATE REPORT, supra note 129, at 1.
'4' Title I is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994).
' PERRuT, supra note 26, at 102.
' See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1994). The statute provides "(1) Except as otherwise
specifically provided in this chapter any person who- (a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors
to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire,
oral, or electronic communication; . . . shall be punished as provided... or shall be
subject to suit as provided. .. ." Id. The Title also outlaws the use of information ac-
quired by unlawful interception:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who-
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire,
oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know
that the information was obtained through the interception ... in
violation of this subsection; . . . shall be punished as provided . . .
or shall be subject to suit as provided....
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(d) (1994). The Title also outlaws the disclosure of information ac-
quired by unlawful interception:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who-
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other
person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication,
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained
through the interception ... in violation of this subsection; shall be
punished as provided ... or shall be subject to suit as provid-
ed....
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (1994).
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communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or
other device."'" Knowledge of the definitions of wire communi-
cation and electronic communication facilitate understanding of
what Title I actually outlaws.
Wire communication is defined in the ECPA as "any aural
transfer made.., by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connec-
tion.. . ."" An example of a wire communication is an ordinary
telephone call.1" The term wire communication also includes
"any electronic storage of such communication;"'47 common ex-
amples of stored wire communications are voice mail messages and
answering machine tapes'"
An electronic communication is "any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence... but does not
include ... any wire communications. . . ." Electronic mail,
while in transit from sender to receiver, is an example of an elec-
tronic communication."5 The definition of electronic communi-
cation does not include "any electronic storage of such communica-
tion" as the definition of wire communication does.
By outlawing the acquisition of wire and electronic communi-
cation streams, Title I of the ECPA outlaws such activities as wire-
tapping a telephone conversation, acquiring the contents of a voice
mail message, and acquiring an e-mail message as it streams from
sender to receiver. The ECPA thus offers protection to the e-mail
utilizing attorney and client. By outlawing interception of electronic
communications, the ECPA deters individuals who would otherwise
attempt to profit from electronic mail's technological limita-
tions.' t Accordingly, Title I decreases the potential for the real-
ization of the danger associated with electronic mail.
Title I also limits the consequences associated with the realiza-
tion of the dangers of e-mail. Any otherwise privileged communi-
cation intercepted under the ECPA, lawfully" or unlawfully,
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1994).
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994).
i See SENATE REPORT, supra note 129, at 12 (stating that "wire communication
encompasses the whole of a voice-telephone transmission").
i 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994).
'" See SENATE REPORT, supra note 129, at 12 (stating that "wire communications in
storage like voice mail, remain wire communications" for the purposes of the Act).
' .18 u.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994).
' See SENATE REPORT, supra note 129, at 14.
5' Deterrence is achieved through the imposition on the violator of both civil and
criminal penalties. Relief in a civil action may include actual damages, statutory damages,
punitive damages, and reasonable attorney fees. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520(a), 2520(b) (1994).
Criminal penalties include a minimum $500 fine for some second offenders, and imprison-
ment of up to five years is permitted in lieu of or in addition to the fine. See 18 u.S.C.
§§ 2511(4), 2511(5) (1994).
in. A lawful interception would be an interception permitted by court order. See 18
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does not lose its privileged character because of such intercep-
tion.15
3
b. Title II of the ECPA
Title HI of the ECPA is also relevant to this Note. The key
violative activity under Title H is access, as compared with inter-
ception in Title I. An individual who unlawfully accesses "a wire
or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage" in a
facility in which electronic communication services are provided
violates Title H." An example of such a violation is the access-
ing of an e-mail message in storage on a computer, awaiting for-
warding to its recipient."6
Like Title I, Title H uses deterrence to offer protection to
attorneys and clients who wish to communicate via electronic mail.
Title H criminally punishes an unlawful access with various combi-
nations of fines and imprisonment, depending upon the purpose of
the access and the offender's history of Act violations." 7 Title 11
also permits civil actions, granting actual damages incurred because
of the access, punitive damages for wilful violations, and reason-
able attorney fees.' Through the imposition of these penalties,
Title II decreases the probability that the danger associated with
electronic mail will materialize.
There is no provision in Title II that protects otherwise privi-
leged information from losing its privilege upon a violative or even
lawful access. Only intercepted electronic communications are
statutorily protected from losing their privilege under Title V
U.S.C. § 2518 (1994) (outlining the procedure through which a court may grant an order
authorizing an interception).
' See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1994).
' Title Ii is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (1994).
ISS 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (1994). That section states:
(a) Offense-Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, whoever-
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided; or
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and there-
by obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage in such system
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
lId
Is See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457 (5th
Cir. 1994) (affirming a district court determination that the federal government violated
Title 11 by confiscating, without the appropriate court approval, a computer that held un-
read e-mail messages stored in its memory).
5" See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(b) (1994).
' See 18 U.S.C. § 2707(b) (1994).
's See supra notes 113, 144-51 and accompanying text.
1998]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
2. Inadvertent Disclosure
A second legal system that attempts to decrease the conse-
quences of a realization of the dangers associated with electronic
mail recognizes that imperfect users increase the risk that electroni-
cally mailed communications will lose their confidentiality. If an
attorney wishes to send his or her client a confidential message
electronically, and accidentally places an opposing counsel's ad-
dress as a carbon copy recipient, the contents of that message are
no longer secret. An important question is whether any attorney-
client privilege otherwise attached to that communication is waived.
Within the discussion of the attorney-client privilege supra,"W
it was noted that some jurisdictions maintain that for waiver to
result, communication of privileged information to a third party
must be intentional.' This approach, called the "subjective intent
approach," is the traditional rule in inadvertent disclosure cases.
Generally, the subjective intent approach holds that no waiver of
the attorney-client privilege results after an inadvertent disclosure.
A court adopting this approach begins its analysis with a definition
of waiver as "the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right,"'" and proceeds to a discussion of the beneficiary
of the privilege. Because the privilege exists for the benefit of the
client, the logical conclusion in a subjective intent jurisdiction is
that without client intention to relinquish the privilege, there can be
no waiver. The negligent acts of one's counsel may not be imputed
to, and result in punishment of, the client.63
Those jurisdictions that adopt the subjective intent approach
seemingly offer legal protection to the electronic mail using attor-
ney and client. Because the requisite intent to abandon the privi-
lege is absent, privileged status will not be lost if a message is
inadvertently missent.
Not all jurisdictions adopt the subjective intent approach; the
trend is toward adopting the "relative conduct approach" to deter-
mine whether an inadvertent disclosure amounts to waiver. The
relative conduct approach examines various factors to determine
whether the privilege has been lost. "The reasonableness of the
precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; . . . [t]he time
taken to rectify the error, . . . [t]he extent of disclosure; ... [and
t]he overriding issue of fairness"'" are among the factors exam-
'" See supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
1. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
16. Mendenhall v. Barber Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. IM. 1982).
163. See id.
. Monarch Cement Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 558, 560 (D. Kan.
1990). Most inadvertent disclosure cases arise after counsel inadvertently includes privi-
leged documents in a discovery request. The fifth factor usually examined is the extent of
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ined. The courts accepting this view "emphasize the relative inad-
vertence of the production versus [the] intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.... [Tihey resist waiver of the
privilege where there is unintentional production with reasonable
precautions taken. ' '""s However, understanding that the conse-
quences of carelessness should not go unaccounted for, middle
ground jurisdictions will find implied waiver of the privilege when
the facts surrounding the disclosure demonstrate continued protec-
tion is unwarranted."e6
Under the proper circumstances, protection can be afforded to
client-attorney e-mail communications in those jurisdictions adopt-
ing the relative conduct approach. No case has yet dealt with the
issue of a mistakenly sent electronic mail message, but protection
was granted in a recent case in which a privileged document was
mistakenly faxed to an opposing counsel." The court ultimately
determined that fairness weighed in favor of maintaining privi-
lege,"es but found the sending party's precautions to be inade-
quate."6 It is not clear what procedures will be adopted by the
legal community that will amount to reasonable precautions with
respect to sending electronic mail, but with reasonable precautions,
the factor test jurisdictions can decrease the effects of lost confi-
dentiality for the attorney and client.
There are technological and legal systems currently available or
in place that reduce, or attempt to reduce, the risks associated with
electronic mail. The technological solutions provide a means of
preventing confidentiality from being lost, and legal systems are in
place that both prevent and decrease the effects of lost confidential-
ity. Are the existing legal protections sufficient on their own,
though? Is availing oneself of technological protection simply a
matter of business judgment, or should there be a duty to use the
technology? The third step in risk management, the development of
a strategy to control the risks falling outside of the discussed
protections, is now appropriate.
such discovery request. Because the inadvertent disclosure discussed in this Note is not
based upon a document request, the fifth factor is not discussed.
"'. Rinaman, supra note 118, at 614.
i" See Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding
that the proper analysis regarding inadvertent disclosures must take into account, on a
case by case basis, the circumstances surrounding the disclosure).
". See Anne G. Bruckner-Harvey, Inadvertent Disclosure in the Age of Fax Machines:
Is the Cat Really Out of the Bag?, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 385 (1994).
'6 See James P. Ulwick, Producing By Mistake, LITIGATION, Spring 1992, at 20, 68
(discussing the ethical and legal consequences of a case in which a legal secretary mistak-
enly faxed a document to opposing counsel).
" 9. See id. at 68. The sending attorney did not properly instruct his temporary secre-
tary on the office policy regarding inadvertent facsimile transmissions. See id.
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If. FORMULATION OF A STRATEGY TO CONTROL THE ASSOCIATED
RISKS
A. Previously Proposed Strategies
Before discussing the proposed strategy, examining the strate-
gies proposed by the legal community to date is helpful.
1. Proposed Strategy #1: Sole Reliance on Existing Legal
Protections
As discussed supra, legal protections exist that reduce the risks
associated with electronic mail usage. Thus, one strategy for the
legal community to adopt in relation to electronic mail usage is
sole reliance on existing legal protections.
A recently published article adopts such an approach. Privilege
and Confidentiality in Cyberspace,"0 authored by Albert Gidari,
addresses whether the attorney-client privilege can be maintained
when attorney and client communicate over the Internet. The article
discusses the ECPA's prohibition on the interception of electronic
and wire communications' and the ECPA's maintenance of the
attorney-client privilege on any otherwise privileged electronic or
wire communication intercepted under the ECPA.' The article
further explains that no ECPA provision statutorily protects the
attorney-client privilege after an access of stored data. Congress
failed to include such a provision, it argues, because "none is
needed."'73 The common law rule holds that "there is no waiver
of privilege when a thief steals a document out of a file cabinet,
and likewise no waiver [will occur] when the file is in digital form
and the break-in occurs through the phone line."'7 The article
concludes that the ECPA sufficiently protects the attorney-client
privilege; the level of communication security an enterprise chooses
should be based on business judgment, not on fear of losing the
attorney-client privilege."
Mr. Gidari's interpretation of the law of electronic communi-
cations is not wholly unpersuasive. A key provision of the ECPA
for the attorney and client is §2517(4).176 This provision main-
tains the status of any otherwise privileged communication inter-
1 Albert Gidari, Privilege and Confidentiality in Cyberspace, COMPUrER LAW., Feb.
1996, at 1.
". See id. at 1; see also supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
372 See Gidari, supra note 170, at 2; see also supra notes 113, 151-53 and accompa-
nying text.
'. Gidari, supra note 170, at 2; see also supra note 159 and accompanying text.Gidari, supra note 170, at 2.
172. See id. at 3.
' 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1994); see also supra notes 113, 153 and accompanying text.
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cepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the ECPA. Mr.
Gidari's conclusion that the ECPA protects against loss of privilege
when communications are intercepted is accurate.
Note the language of §2517(4), though: "[n]o otherwise privi-
leged... electronic communication... shall lose its privileged
character"' due to an interception. The application of §2517(4)
requires an initial showing that the communication was privileged.
For a communication to obtain the protection of the attorney-client
privilege it must be sheathed in a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy. A legitimate inquiry can thus be made into whether that
sheathe is available to communications made via the breachable
electronic mail format. 179
Mr. Gidari suggests in his article that Congress directly provid-
ed the sheathe. Gidari states that the ECPA makes "clear that es-
sentially any communication carried over a communication system
provided by a telecommunications carrier is deemed to be not
'readily accessible to the general public' ... [and thus sheathed
in] a reasonable expectation of privacy.""'8
Mr. Gidari's analysis on this point is based upon ECPA
§2510(161... At the time Mr. Gidari's article was published, this
subsection stated: "(16) 'readily accessible to the general public'
means, with respect to a radio communication, that such communi-
cation is not--... (F) an electronic communication. '' " A plain
reading of this does not suggest that §2510(16) reveals the nature
of electronic communications; it seems to apply only to radio com-
munications. The legislative history of the ECPA interprets this
provision, though, as stating that radio communications are not
deemed to be readily accessible to the general public when they
,n Id. (emphasis added).
"' See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
". Cf supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of this
question to telegraphic messages).
" Gidari, supra note 170, at 3.
181- 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) (1994). The section currently- reads:
(16) "readily accessible to the general public" means, with respect to a radio
communication, that such communication is not-
(A) scrambled or encrypted;
(B) transmitted using modulation techniques whose essential parame-
ters have been withheld from the public... ,
(C) carried on a subcarrier... ;
(D) transmitted over a communication system provided by a common
carrier ... ; or
(E) transmitted on frequencies allocated under... [various parts of
the section].
Id.
,z 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) (1994), amended by Communications Assistance for Law En-
forcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 203, 108 Stat. 4279, 4291 (1996).
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"fit into one of five specified categories. These excepted catego-
ries . . . usually are not susceptible to interception by the general
public."'' Electronic communications were, at the time of publi-
cation of Mr. Gidari's article, one of the excepted categories. Thus,
a fair interpretation of the ECPA at the time Mr. Gidari authored
his article was that electronic communications in general were not
readily susceptible to interception by the general public, and there-
fore able to be sheathed in a reasonable expectation of privacy.
However, Part (F) of Subsection 16 was recently repealed."
Electronic communications are no longer included among the list of
communications that are deemed "usually... not susceptible to
interception by the general public.' ' " Mr. Gidari's reliance on the
ECPA to sheathe electronic mail in a reasonable expectation of
privacy is thus dated; the ECPA no longer provides the solution
Mr. Gidari relied upon in his proposal.
Common law may provide the sheathe, though. A military
court, whose rulings are only persuasive authority in civilian courts
of law,'86 recently discussed the expectation of privacy in an elec-
tronic mail message. The court held that "appellant clearly had
an ... expectation of privacy in those messages stored in comput-
ers which he alone could retrieve through the use of his own as-
signed password. Similarly, he had an. . . expectation of privacy
with regard to messages he transmitted electronically to other sub-
scribers."'" The court held that messages stored on network com-
puters awaiting retrieval by the intended recipient, and messages in
transmission, are reasonably expected to be private. The court
admonished "[i]n the modem age of communications, society must
recognize such expectations of privacy as reasonable."' 8
In addition, civilian courts asked to determine whether to per-
mit the discovery of e-mail communications have denied production
on the basis of privilege. In a recent case, thirty-two e-mail com-
munications were held undiscoverable due to attorney-client privi-
lege protection.'89 A second court granted a writ of prohibition to
3- H.R. REP. No. 103-827(), at 81 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489,
3511 (emphasis added).
"' See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 731(2)(C), 110 Stat. 1303, 1303 (striking subparagraph (F) of § 2510(16) and thereby
excluding electronic communications from being statutorily "readily accessible to the gen-
eral public").
18. H.R. REP. No. 103-827().
6 See KENNETH R. REDDEN, FEDERAL SPECIAL COURT LmGATION 221-23 (Evan G.
Lewis et al. eds., 1982) (discussing the authority of military court decisions in civilian
courts).
1" United States v. Maxwell, 42 MJ. 568, 576 (A.F. Crim. App. 1995) (upholding
the court martial's dismissal of an Air Force Colonel for violations, through use of his
personal computer, of federal pornography laws).
d. 
. See National Employment Serv. Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 3 Mass. L. Rptr.
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ensure nondisclosure of an e-mail communication, holding that the
contents of the e-mail message were privileged.1" It thus seems
that electronic mail communications are increasingly considered
sheathed in a reasonable expectation of privacy by the courts; the
attorney-client privilege is available to the contents of e-mail. If the
courts continue along this trend, the common law, in conjunction
with the ECPA, will allow electronic mail messages to obtain the
privilege and then maintain it after an interception.
The express language of §2517(4) of the ECPA applies its
protections only to interceptions, though.19" ' There is no mention
in the Section, or in the ECPA, of the effect that an access of a
stored communication has on the privilege. Can the interception
sections of the ECPA be applied to activities that appear to be
accesses? The quick answer to that question is no. The ECPA is
quite distinct in its treatment of interceptions and accesses, each
having its own Title."ss Courts would be in complete derogation
of principles of statutory construction if they were to hold that
§2517(4) was really meant to apply to both accesses and intercep-
tions.
The next question to ask is whether behaviors that appear to be
accesses can be reclassified as interceptions. Of more specific con-
cem to this Note, can the unlawful access of a stored electronic
communication be classified as an interception of a stored electron-
ic communication?
A 1994 case first raised the issue of whether an action that
appeared classifiable as an unlawful access could be classified an
unlawful interception. The case, Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. Unit-
ed States Secret Service,ise placed before the court the question
"whether the seizure of a computer on which is stored private E-
mail that has been sent.., but not yet read (retrieved) by the
recipients, constitutes an 'intercept"' within the meaning of Title I
of the ECPA.194 After examining the language of the ECPA, and
its legislative history, the court determined that Congress intended
221 (1994) (holding that because e-mail messages between defendant's corporate counsel
and defendant's outside counsel were made in the outside counsel's professional capacity,
they were privileged and undiscoverable; notably, the court did not raise the issue of
whether the electronic mail format affected the availability of the privilege).
' See State v. Canady, 460 SE.2d 677 (W. Va. 1995).
'9'. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1994). For further discussion of this section, see supra
note 113 and accompanying text.
"92 See supra notes 143-59 and accompanying text.
i' 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that seizure of a computer containing private,
unread e-mail did not constitute an intercept under the ECPA; the federal government
argued for reclassification because as an intercept their activity was properly authorized, as
an access, it was not).
'" Id. at 460.
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to treat stored wire and stored electronic communications different-
ly 95 "Congress' ... omission in [the] definition [of electronic
communication] of the phrase 'any electronic storage of such
communication' (part of the definition of 'wire communication')
reflects that Congress did not intend for 'intercept' to apply to
'electronic communications' when those communications are in
'electronic storage'."'" The court held that the access could not,
therefore, be an intercept."9
Since the Steve Jackson decision, two additional cases reasoned
that the language of the ECPA combats any attempt to reclassify
accesses of stored electronic communications as interceptions. 98
Courts are repeatedly asserting that stored electronic communica-
tions cannot be intercepted.
Stored electronic communications accessed under the Act thus
have no statutory privilege protection. Common law must prevent
loss of the attorney-client privilege. Mr. Gidari asserts that the
common law does prevent such a loss, and that, as a result, no
statutory protection is needed.'" Mr. Gidari is correct in his as-
sertion that the common law protects the privilege from being
waived upon a thief's or an eavesdropper's activity? ° Additional-
ly, "a party does not waive the attorney-client privilege for docu-
ments which he is compelled to produce."' Thus, whether stored
e-mail communications are accessed in violation of, or in accor-
dance with the Act, the common law will seemingly protect the
attorney-client privilege.
Analysis beyond statutory interpretation of the ECPA was nec-
essary to conclude that the attorney-client privilege is protected
from lawful or unlawful accesses or interceptions of electronic
communications, but legal principles alone protect the privilege.
Perhaps Mr. Gidari's approach, strict reliance on legal protections
and use of technology only if business judgment so suggests, is
appropriate.
In reality, however, it is not. Mr. Gidari's analysis of the
" See id. at 461-63. Recall the difference in treatment between stored wire and
stored electronic communications discussed supra at note 156 and accompanying text.
" Steve Jackson Games, Inc., 36 F.3d at 461-62.
1" See id. at 458.
" See Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding that no
interception of electronic communications in the form of alphanumeric pages is possible
when the electronic communications are in storage); United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp.
818 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that seizure of pagers containing private, unread messages
did not constitute an intercept under the ECPA).
'" See Gidari, supra note 170, at 2.
2 See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
". Transamerica Computer, Inc. v. International Bus. Machines, Corp., 573 F.2d 646,
651 (9th Cir. 1978) (emphasis omitted). A lawful access under the ECPA of a stored
electronic communication will not affect the privilege that attached to the communication.
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ECPA's effect on the attorney-client privilege may be accurate, but
his proposal is misleading and overbroad. There are issues beyond
the scope of Mr. Gidari's article, yet the article's tenor suggests to
the reader that the only issue that exists for the attorney and client
when conveying confidential communications over the Internet is
loss of privilege through interception or access. He states, for ex-
ample, "there are.., real business risks associated with the use of
digital communications today... but privilege waiver probably is
not one of them." He also states "[ifn the end, the degree of
privacy necessary for communications should be a business deci-
sion." Certainly business decisions are going to be a piece of
the attorney and client's determination of whether to use electronic
mail to convey confidential information. Business decisions and the
issue of waiver of the attorney-client privilege by interception or
access are not the only elements of the decision, though.
As previously discussed,' waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege may occur inadvertently, without third party interception or
access. The traditional, subjective intent approach to this scenario
protects the electronic mail utilizing attorney and client.' Also,
in the appropriate fact pattern, the factor test will provide protec-
tion. But there is a third approach: some jurisdictions hold that
unintentional disclosure always amounts to a waiver. This
"strict responsibility approach" to waiver of the attorney-client
privilege places a great burden on the attorney and client, waiving
the privilege after an inadvertent disclosure despite any reasonable
care taken to prevent the disclosure. 8
The jurisdictions that adopt the strict responsibility approach
look to realism rather than theory. These jurisdictions reject the
notion that only the client may waive the privilege,' and also
question the relative conduct approach's examination into the pre-
cautions taken to protect the privileged document. Courts that adopt
the strict responsibility approach state that such an examination is a
fiction: the existence of the disclosure manifests the insufficiency
of the precautions taken.21 Under this theory, no party is granted
the benefit of the privilege if they fail to treat their privileged
" Gidari, supra note 170, at 1 (emphasis added).
2a Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 115-18, 161-69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 115, 161-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 117, 164-69 and accompanying text.
. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
See Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549
(D.C. Dist. 1970).
" See id.
211 See, e.g., United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E).
Mich. 1954).
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communication "like jewels-if not crown jewels.""21
There is no legal protection afforded the missent e-mail mes-
sage in jurisdictions that follow the strict responsibility approach.
The possibility that human error can cause waiver of the attorney-
client privilege suggests that legal protections alone are not suffi-
cient to decrease the dangers of lost confidentiality in those juris-
dictions.
Legal protections alone are also insufficient to prevent disci-
plinary sanctions. Sanctions such as a reprimand and an admonish-
ment may be imposed upon the attorney for negligently revealing
client confidences.2"2 Presently there is no established legal stan-
dard stating that using electronic mail to convey client confidences
without security technology is reasonable. The ECPA's outlaw of
an interception of electronic communications does not guarantee
that a disciplinary proceeding would find an attorney not negligent
for relying on e-mail.
Besides leaving open the effect of an inadvertent disclosure and
failing to prevent disciplinary sanctions, the legal protections avail-
able do not prevent an attorney malpractice claim based on a fail-
ure to maintain confidentiality while using e-mail. Recall that
unique to the claim of attorney malpractice is an inquiry into
whether the attorney acted in accordance with the standard behav-
ior of his or her professional community1  Presently there is no
standard protocol within the legal community regarding the use of
electronic mail. Encryption is not widely used, and there is evi-
dence that even external e-mail is not yet widely used. 14 This
does not imply that technological protection is not required,
though. "[A] whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adop-
tion of new and available devices.... Courts must in the end say
what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even their
universal disregard will not excuse their omission."2 5
Sole reliance on legal systems does not provide complete pro-
tection for the attorney and client. Existing legal protections miti-
gate the effects of lost confidentiality, but do not fully remove
them. This suggests that to ensure the appropriate use of e-mail,
the legal community should consider imposing upon itself a duty to
use technological protections. Has such a duty developed?
21. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
21 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. Note that harm does not need to be
established for an admonishment to be administered.
2. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
21 See supra note 59.
25. The TJ. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (hold-
ing a tug unseaworthy because of its unreasonable failure to have a weather radio aboard,
even though the custom in the tug industry was to not carry a radio).
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2. Proposed Strategy #2: The Duty to Use Technology
Articles currently being published advise lawyers that cryptog-
raphy is the solution to Internet based confidentiality concerns." 6
The articles identify the benefits that technologies such as cryptog-
raphy provide to the legal community, but the commentators have
not suggested that there is, or should be, a duty to use such tech-
nology. Bar Associations, however, have.
a. Effect of Bar Association Ethics Opinions
Bar Association ethics opinions, promulgated by the ABA
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (ABA Com-
mittee), and by committees in all but seven states, are "a means by
which the bar establishment can affirm its conception of the appro-
priate... attitudes of lawyers." 7 Advisory opinions are promul-
gated under different systems depending on the lawyer's home
state. Many bar committees follow the ABA Committee's approach
of issuing formal opinions on matters of general interest to the bar
and informal opinions responding to more specific inquiries." 8
Some states have developed their own systems of opinion issu-
ance.
219
In all states, however, the typical purpose of ethics opinions is
to assist lawyers in interpreting the ethics rules of their states 20
The committees examine the lawyer codes adopted by their states
and determine ethical courses of conduct given fact patterns posed
by bar members. By posing a question to his or her state's ethics
committee as to the appropriate use of electronic mail, an attorney
may therefore increase his or her understanding of the ethical duty
with respect to e-mail use, and decrease the potential for disciplin-
ary sanctions.
b. The Opinions
Attorneys in both North Carolina and Iowa have presented the
issue of electronic mail use to their state bar ethics committees.
2,' See supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also Elsa Kramer, The Ethics of
E-Mail: Litigation Takes On One Of The Challenges of Cyberspace, RES GFSTAE, Jan.
1996 at 24, 27 ('All security experts are in agreement about the necessity of encrypting
e-mail... "); Merrill, supra note 28, at 23 ("[I]t is possible today for a user to use
public key cryptography to encrypt the data itself in a completely secure manner.").
217. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmIcs 65 (1986).
21' See Whitney A. McCaslin, Empowering Ethics Committees, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-
IcS 959, 974 (1996).
219. See id.
2 See id. at 964.
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i. North Carolina
A North Carolina attorney posed an inquiry to the North Caro-
lina State Bar requesting an interpretation of "a lawyer's ethical
obligation when using electronic mail to communicate confidential
client information."' The North Carolina attorney asked whether
the electronic mail medium could be used and if so whether it
could be used without security technology. The response opinion,
entitled "Modem Communications Technology and the Duty of
Confidentiality," was published on April 13, 1995.' The opinion
concluded that while utilizing electronic mail, or any other insecure
medium of communication,' precautions need to be taken to
protect client confidentiality. 4 The precautions are not explicitly
technological, but are twofold:
First, the lawyer must use reasonable care to select a mode
of communication that, in light of the exigencies of the
existing circumstances, will best maintain any confidential
information that might be conveyed in the communication.
Second, if the lawyer knows or has reason to believe that
the communication is over a telecommunication device that
is susceptible to interception, the lawyer must advise the
other parties to the communication of the risks of intercep-
tion and the potential for confidentiality to be lost.'
The Bar thus concluded that while using electronic mail or any
other technology "susceptible to interception," the lawyer's first
duty is to use reasonable care to select a mode of communication
which best maintains confidentiality. The lawyer's second duty is
to inform the client or peer with whom he or she is communicat-
ing via telecommunication modes susceptible to interception, that
confidentiality may be lost.'m
ii. Iowa
An Iowa attorney has also recently inquired into the propriety
of communicating confidentially with clients via electronic mail,
asking whether an Iowa law firm could use the Internet for elec-
tronic communications with clients.
21 North Carolina State Bar, Published Op. 215 (1995).
21d.
2' See id. (discussing the insecurity of cordless and cellular telephones as well).
2. See id.
2Z Id.
Id.
2M. See id.
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The responding Formal Opinion, "Lawyer Home Page or Web
Site on the Internet," dated August 29, 1996, explicitly interprets
the lawyer's ethical responsibility of maintaining confidentiality as
including a duty to use technology." The Iowa Supreme Court
Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct opined that the ethical
duty to maintain client confidences found in DR 4-101'9 requires
that "sensitive material" sent to or received by clients by e-mail
must be "encrypted or protected by password/firewall or [another]
generally accepted ... security system. ' Written acknowledg-
ment by a client of the risk of violation of DR 4-101, and consent
to e-mail's use, can be obtained instead.n This ethical opinion
places a duty on the attorney to either secure sensitive material
with technology, or obtain informed consent from the client regard-
ing e-mail use.
iii. The Opinions' Applicability
The Iowa and North Carolina ethics committees' intentions are
meritorious, encouraging attorneys to use the most secure mode
when communicating with clients. Should the lawyer codes be read
to impose a duty to use technology, though?
The existing, explicit duty of confidentiality found in the law-
yers codes imposes upon the legal community the duty to not
reveal client confidences. The language of the Model Rules is
negative: "A lawyer shall not reveal. . . ."' DR 4-101 of the
Model Code also states the attorney's basis for discipline in the
negativeY Relying on this negative language of the codes, one
recognizes that knowing or intentional revelations of client confi-
dences are improper. The Model Code even incorporated a knowl-
edge requirement into its DR 4-101, prohibiting a lawyer from
"knowingly" revealing client confidences.1 4
Within this negative duty, however, is the positive duty to
protect client confidences. The Model Code's Canon 4 expressly
states that the axiomatic norm is preservation ns Comment to the
Model Rules states that "[tihe common law recognizes that the
2's Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct, Formal Op. 96-1
(1996).
2'9- Iowa's DR 4-101 is identical to the Model Code's DR 4-101. See IOWA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIMrY FOR LAWYERS DR 4-101 (1993).
' Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct, Formal Op. 96-1
(1996).
"'- See id.
2- MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUct Rule 1.6(a) (1995) (emphasis added).
2 See supra note 83.
2" See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILITY DR 4-101(B) (1983).
" See supra note 82.
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client's confidences must be protected from disclosure." 6 By fo-
cusing on the positive duty, rather than the negative duty, it is
easier to recognize that negligent revelation is likewise prohibited.
The attorney must not take steps that will reveal client confidences,
and the attorney must take steps to preserve client confidences.
It is under the guise of preservation and protection that North
Carolina and Iowa have incorporated the duty to use technology
into their readings of their lawyers' codes. How better to protect
client confidences than with technological protections on the medi-
um through which the confidence is transmitted? Technology less-
ens the danger of losing confidentiality in the first place.
The explicit imposition of a technology specific duty in the
Iowa opinion fails, though, because it will discourage e-mail's use.
First, the incorporation of specific security controls in the opinion
discourages e-mail's use because it implies that electronic mail is
unique from other communication technologies. Special controls are
explicitly stated as required for use with e-mail, but if, as the
Introduction to this Note suggests, eavesdropping on communica-
tions has been a problem since the invention of the telegraph,'
then why is the adoption of a duty to protect with specific technol-
ogy only appropriate for e-mail? What special technologies need to
be used to insure the maintenance of confidentiality over cellular
telephones, cordless telephones, facsimile machines or the tel-
ex?"8 Because Iowa has not explicitly informed its constituency
of any special technological protection requirements for these me-
dia, the Iowa bar may lead to the incorrect conclusion that e-mail
is relatively more insecure than any of the other communication
media available. This discourages e-mail use, an undesirable out-
come considering the great benefits e-mail offers the attorney and
client.239
Second, the use of language such as "encryption" and "pass-
word/firewall" may promote the misperception that e-mail is more
insecure than other communication technologies. The controls that
must be placed upon e-mail to ensure its security sound ominous,
much more so than the commonly accepted protection on a fax
machine transmission: a confidential legend.2' For attorneys who
216 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1995).
3 See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
' Each of these media are used in the legal profession, but each has limitations. For
an overview of communications technologies used in the legal profession, see generally
WRIGHT, supra note 2.
23" See supra Part ll.B.
24g See Bruckner-Harvey, supra note 167, at 393 (discussing the use of a confidential
legend to prevent waiver of the attorney-client privilege after an inadvertent disclosure of
a fax).
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know little about electronic mail or the technology involved with
it, a reading of Iowa's opinion may deter them from ever finding
out more. E-mail will be rejected as too troublesome.
North Carolina's opinion also fails because it too discourages
attorneys from using electronic mail, but for a different reason:
ambiguity. The North Carolina State Bar states that attorneys do
not have to use the most infallible method of communication, but
they must use the best method."4 This statement leaves unan-
swered whether secured electronic mail may be used in place of
the fax machine or telephone. North Carolina has not told its law-
yers which communication medium is, in fact, the best. Nor has it
told its bar how it should go about determining what communica-
tion medium is the best. In order safely to comply with the North
Carolina opinion members of the North Carolina bar will likely
forgo use of electronic mail and use a communications technology
with which they are more secure, but which offers fewer benefits
than the e-mail format.
Imposing a specific duty to use technology is thus inappropri-
ate. The Iowa opinion that attempted to do so poses a threat of
preventing increased use of e-mail in the legal community. The
imposition of a very broad duty to use the "most secure" method
of communication is also unworkable. The North Carolina opinion
simply restates the question posed, serving only to confuse its Bar.
Both opinions do recognize, however, the positive duty of the
attorney to preserve and protect client communications. It is this
positive duty that should be taken from the opinions and incorpo-
rated into the appropriate strategy.
B. The Appropriate Strategy
The appropriate strategy to adopt in bar opinions is recognition
that there is a duty implicit in the Model Code and Model Rules
to take all steps reasonable under the circumstances to protect
client communications when using modem communication technol-
ogies such as electronic mail. This encourages e-mail using attor-
neys to examine the legal protections and the technological
protections afforded electronic mail. It will encourage the use of an
adequate combination of both, without failing for the reasons that
Iowa's and North Carolina's opinions fail.
u" See supra note 221.
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1. Why Bar Opinions?
Bar Association opinions are the appropriate place to establish
the duty of care with respect to the use of e-mail. Opinions offer
an issuing state's attorneys an interpretation of their ethical duty of
confidentiality, enabling attorneys to modify their conduct before
confidentiality is lost. If confidentiality is mistakenly lost, there
may be less chance of disciplinary action taken against the attorney
as he or she will have acted in accordance with the state bar's
suggestions. Bar opinions are also the appropriate medium because
they are not permanent. Ethics opinions are not opinions on ques-
tions of law.242 Matters important to lawyers that are timely are
appropriate inquiries;243 if the legal landscape changes, so can the
opinion. Matters regarding the duties associated with the use of a
specific technology are timely. Already, changes in electronic mail
are occurring in the telecommunications industry' that, if adopt-
ed by the legal profession, will cause lawyers again to rethink the
nature of their confidentiality duty. Bar opinions provide the forum
for frequent reexamination of the issue.
Bar opinions are also important because they can effectively
stimulate the adoption of a community standard. Attorneys look to
opinions, before any harm results, for an indication of what "the
herd" is and should be doing.' Attorneys then adapt their behav-
ior to "the herd's." If harm does occur, reliance on the community
standard can be used as a defense in an attorney malpractice case.
Likewise, in cases in which it must be shown that reasonable steps
were taken to prevent an inadvertent disclosure of client communi-
cations, adherence to the community standard may be used to show
reasonable precautions taken.
Iowa's and North Carolina's attempts to aid their attorneys in
developing a strategy for controlling the risks associated with elec-
tronic mail are accurate to the extent that each relies on an ethics
opinion to convey the strategy. Their proposals fail, however, be-
cause the strategies they convey are improper. The appropriate
strategy is found in The Restatement of the Law Governing Law-
yers.
See WOLFRAM, supra note 217, at 67.
23. See id. at 66-67.
2" A cellular phone with an attached miniature keyboard permits users to send and
receive electronic mail wirelessly. See Wayne Cunningham Forget PC's: The Internet is
Going Pocket-Sized, THE NmT, Dec. 1996, at 12. Alphanumeric pagers can now receive
electronic mail from a PC. See E-Mail You Can't Escape, THE NET, Mar. 1997, at 27.
2 . See WOLFRAM, supra note 217, at 65.
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2. The Positive Duty
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers accurately
summarizes the duty of confidentiality that the attorney holds. To
safeguard client confidences the lawyer has a duty "not to use or
disclose [client] information if doing so poses a risk to the interests
of the client."2* This negative duty is representative of the princi-
ple set forth in Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules and DR 4-101 of the
Model Code. The lawyer shall not reveal the confidences of the
client unless the revelation falls into one of the excepted catego-
ries.
The Restatement goes one step further. The Restatement states
that the lawyer "shall take steps reasonable under the circumstances
to protect confidential client information ... against use or disclo-
sure by others that may adversely affect a material interest of the
client." This positive duty is found implicitly in the Model
Rules and Model Code, and should be the foundation of ethics
opinions broaching the subject of whether electronic mail can be
used to carry confidential information in the practice of law.
Incorporating, into bar opinions, the duty of the lawyer to take
steps reasonable under the circumstances is the appropriate strategy
for two reasons. First, the positive duty standard is in alignment
with the legal protections afforded electronic mail. To prevent
disciplinary sanctions, for example, the attorney must not have
negligently revealed client confidences. The negligence standard
recognizes a duty to act reasonably under the circumstances. Also,
a claim of attorney malpractice will only succeed if it can be
shown that the attorney acted unreasonably vis-A-vis his or her
colleagues. In addition, the relative conduct jurisdiction in inadver-
tent disclosure cases will examine whether the attorney took rea-
sonable precautions to prevent the disclosure.
The second reason the positive duty is appropriate is because
its adoption in bar opinions encourages the use of technology with-
out explicitly mandating it. Attorneys will look to their state bar
opinions for guidance, and be told that there is a duty to take
affirmative steps to protect the contents of electronic mail commu-
nications. This will lead an attorney to examine the legal
protections afforded the medium, enabling the attorney to determine
for him- or herself whether or not the law provides adequate pro-
tection. The attorney will then determine whether he or she is re-
quired to take the additional step of employing security technology
21" RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYS § 111 cmt. (Tentative Draft No.
3, 1990).
SLd. § 111(2).
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with his or her electronic mail communications. If the attorney
wishes to use security technology, he or she can personally deter-
mine the nature of such security technology. In effect, Albert
Gidari's business judgment approach will become mandatory.
3. The Model Opinion
The New York City Bar, in an opinion dealing with the use of
cellular and cordless technologies in the practice of law, addressed
whether confidential communications could be made over such
modes of communication.' s The New York City Bar adopted the
language of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers in
answering the inquiry, 9 and provided a model that other states
should adopt in addressing the question of how to control the risks
associated with electronic mail. By modeling their opinions after
New York City's, bars will inform their attorneys that the use of
new communications technologies is appropriate if positive steps
are taken to assess the medium's security. This assessment will
then lead attorneys to the conclusion that the use of a reasonable
amount of technology to secure the medium is sufficient risk man-
agement.
Bar association opinions should conclude:
A lawyer who possesses . . . [confidential communications]
must take "reasonable steps to secure the information
against misuse of inappropriate disclosure" including steps
necessary to assure that "the lawyer and the lawyer's asso-
ciates or agents acquire, store, retrieve, and transmit confi-
dential information for the lawyer's clients under systems
and controls that maintain confidentiality.".... There is no
question that [electronic mail is] a great convenience to the
public in general. Lawyers, however, owe their clients a
solemn duty of confidentiality, and thus should take steps
to avoid the danger of ... disclosure of client confidenc-
es ... through the use of non-private means of communi-
cation.'
IV. CONCLUSION
Electronic mail is a mode of communication that is providing,
and that will continue to provide, great advantages to the legal
profession. The medium offers efficiency, speed, and a means of
2' See New York City Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1994-
11 (1994).
249. See id.
'o Id.
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effective written communication. Competitiveness in an increasingly
technological society demands its use. But it is not without security
risk. Hackers and unscrupulous system administrators may intercept
communications and infallible users may cause an inadvertent dis-
closure of an e-mail's contents. The existing legal framework com-
pounds the problem by remaining insufficient to provide adequate
protection of electronic mail, but technology does exist that can
provide the basis for enabling e-mail's use. Bar association ethics
opinions, with their ability to adapt to a changing legal and techno-
logical environment quickly, should lead the way in creating com-
munity standards with respect to electronic mail. Rather than spe-
cifically imposing a duty to use security technology, though, the
opinions need to recognize clearly that a general, affirmative duty
to protect client confidences exists. This approach will encourage
attorneys to use the medium, but only after a risk management
assessment. The conclusion of the risk management assessment will
be that an appropriate mix of reliance on legal and technological
protections is the best strategy to use in association with electronic
mail.
COLLEEN L. REST
34919981

